Introduction
Shortly after the publication of new data on broadband penetration by the OECD (OECD, 2012), a political discussion has sparked in the media in New Zealand with comments ranging from "New Zealand is going nowhere ultra-fast" (infonews.co.nz, 2012) to "Broadband uptake rises" (The Domininon Post, 2012) . The low ranking of New Zealand with respect to broadband penetration in the OECD has become a political topic already before the Labour government's 2006 telecommunications industry reforms, but has since gradually climbing on the political agenda. The OECD data showed that New Zealand was in December 2011 ranked 17 th on the list of high income OECD countries 1 measured in terms of broadband subscribers per 100 inhabitants (26.9 percent), just behind Japan (27.4 percent) and the United States (27.7 percent) but four places above Australia (24.6 percent) and slightly above the OECD average (25.6 percent) (OECD, 2012) . Over the past six months since December 2011, the number for broadband connection were rising by 2.7 percent, well ahead of the OECD average increase of 1.8 per cent and well ahead of Japan's 1.2 percent rise.
Currently just a small part of broadband subscriptions (0.31 percent) are fiber connections. That means that New Zealand still has some way to go with respect to fiber connections as it is currently lagging behind Australia (0.67 percent) (OECD, 2012) . The contribution of the Ultra-Fast Broadband (UFB) initiative which promised to deliver fiber connections (i.e. 100Mbps/50Mbps) to 75 percent of New Zealanders by 2019 has to be considered in the context of this political discussion.
Similar to developments in Europe, the government of New Zealand recognized in 2008/9 that Next Generation Access (NGA) networks will become important in the development of the broadband market. The developments in Europe and New Zealand have contributed to the understanding with respect to possible migration paths, criteria for migration from traditional broadband to NGA networks and the effects of separation on NGA rollout. In focusing on the different forms of public private interplay (PPI) in New Zealand, the analysis evaluated the risk allocation within the partners involved in the UFB initiative by characterizing different forms of risks. In this context, PPI are considered as alternative means of generating value for private and public stakeholders by lowering risk and reducing uncertainty for private investment.
In the following, the theoretical foundations of public private interplay are discussed (section one).
Afterwards, the emergence of public private interplay in the broadband sector is put in the context of the discussion on next generation networks in New Zealand and in Europe (section two). Then, the evolution and the structure of the broadband sector in New Zealand is compared to 1 For the list of selected high income OECD countries see Table 1 and Table 2. development in Europe over the past ten years. Finally, the UFB initiative and the different forms of PPIs are discussed. The paper concludes with a discussion of the main findings.
2
The incentive for private partners in public private interplay in broadband development: Theoretical perspectives
The national regulatory and legislative framework for public intervention in broadband markets
In the growing literature on the role of public intervention in the development of broadband, the main arguments have been related to public goods properties of broadband and the effects of competition on broadband (Picot & Wernick, 2007) . If public sector entities intend to facilitate broadband deployment, they face the delicate task of putting forward legitimate reasons for intervention ranging from basic infrastructure and market failure arguments to opportunistic rationales (Lehr, Sirbu, & Gillett, 2006; Sadowski, Nucciarelli, & de Rooij, 2009) . A central argument in the political discussions has been whether (or not) broadband can be considered as a public good characterized by non-excludability (i.e. no one can be excluded from consumption) and non-rivalry (i.e. consumption by an individual does not reduce the availability of the good to others) (Picot & Wernick, 2007) . Based on the public goods properties of broadband, the discussion would focus on the public funding available for broadband diffusion and the different ways of stimulating demand.
Competition-related arguments, in contrast, have been put forward to discuss more efficient ways of improving the terms and the design of market regulation, in particular with respect to facilitating inter-and intra-platform competition in broadband markets.
As a result of balancing public-goods related and competition-related arguments, national government in the OECD countries have developed a variety of regulatory models ranging from "distinctly deregulatory" (observable in the United States); to an "interventionist approach" (Japan and Korea) and a "third or middle way" with a focus on regulatory intervention using competition analysis which should limit the impact of industrial policy (European Union) (Huigen & Cave, 2008) .
In New Zealand, the role of government has recently changed from a more deregulatory approach towards a more interventionist approach in which the government becomes involved in the precise specification of the network technology, network implementation and the selection of firms responsible for network rollout. The regulatory and legislative framework in the European Union and New Zealand has provided important pre-conditions for the different types of public intervention available and involvement of private companies in broadband development.
Since the 1990s, different types of public intervention in broadband markets have emerged ranging from public utility models in which a vertically integrated public sector entity supplies services to market based provisioning of broadband services in which arms-length transactions have governed the interaction between different public and private partners. In this context, public private interplay (PPI) is considered as an alternative means of implementing broadband networks, combining public objectives and private interests whilst at the same time complying with the national (and supranational) regulatory and legislative framework. In Europe, PPI has been considered in the context of governmental efforts to comply with the European regulatory and legislative framework while balancing issues of competition-related and public-goods aspects of broadband deployment (Sadowski, et al., 2009) . In contrast to their increasing importance in Europe (Deloitte, 2006) , public private partnerships have hardly operated at all in New Zealand until very recently (Jock, 2010; NIU, 2011) . This resistance against these partnerships can be traced back (Owles, 2008) to a paper for the Treasury on Financing Infrastructure Projects which found "little empirical evidence about costs and benefits of public private partnerships" (Katz, 2006) . As a result, the New Zealand market for PPI has been considered as "developing" (Deloitte, 2006; NIU, 2011) . Recently the discussion has shifted to the role of PPI in providing incentives to private partners to participate in these initiatives in order to facilitate broadband rollout (Falch & Henten, 2010; Jock, 2010; Nucciarelli, Sadowski, & Achard, 2010) . In this way, the incentive structure of PPI with respect to risk and task allocation has to be examined.
The economic foundations of public private interplay
For a long time, public private partnerships have been considered as a way to outsource public services due to budget constraints and as the "lesser evil" in situations in which traditional forms of government provision of these services seem less efficient compared to pure market provision of these services. During this period, most research has focused on describing best practice for public private partnerships (Hodge, Greve, & Boardman, 2010) . More recently research has focused on the different tasks, which can be better be allocated to either a public or a private party in public private partnerships because they are better equipped to plan, execute or manage these tasks (Bettignies & Ross, 2004) . As a result, economists has been on the effects of public private partnerships on competition, the asymmetric risk allocation in public private partnerships, the nature of the relationship-specific assets and the incentive structures for the parties involved (Bettignies & Ross, 2004 ).
The growing literature on public private partnerships has more reluctantly (Bettignies & Ross, 2004 , 2011 provided an economic foundation for these partnerships by concentrating on contract and ownership issues (Hart, 2003) , risk allocation (Allen & Lueck, 1999) and performance (Chong, Huet, Saussier, & Steiner, 2006 (Link, 2006; Link & Scott, 2001) . Recently the role of these partnerships on the allocation of incentives for private parties to foster investment has become a new line of research in the area of broadband diffusion (Falch & Henten, 2008; Howell, 2010; Sadowski, Nucciarelli, & de Rooij, 2009) . In this context, public private interplay (PPI) is defined as an alternative means for public and private stakeholders to generate value by lowering risk and reducing uncertainty for private investment (Gomez-Barroso & Feijóo, 2010; . In the interplay between public and private stakeholders, two extreme models can be distinguished: the public utility model (i.e. public institutions are responsible for retail access) and the market-based model (i.e. private companies provide retail access). In the first model, public funding of the network is the only available financial source. The risk of the entire project has to be taken by public institutions, which deploy the network to perceive targets of public interests (e.g.
bridging digital divide, providing e-government services). In the second model, public funding is usually accompanied by private funding. The interplay of public and private actors usually takes the form of a public-private partnership (PPP) in which mutual financial contribution is crucial .
In industries characterized by very large fixed and sunk costs like telecommunications, PPPs have been used to foster investment in segments in which competitive firms are unable or unwilling to invest. For example, private investors have been reluctant to invest in the passive part of a new fiber-based network as these investments have not only a very long payback period but they are also difficult to recover for regulated firms (OECD, 2008a) . In the Netherlands, for example, a number of fiber investment initiatives have taken the form of a PPP in which public and private parties have taken up different responsibilities for risks in the initial phase of a PPP (Sadowski, et al., 2009 ). For New Zealand, PPPs replicating a vertically integrated production chain using a mixture of contracts and relationship-specific investments seem to have worked rather well to foster long-term investment (Howell, 2010) .
As the responsibility for service provision is a public task, its management can be either public or private. Local authorities may decide to transfer some of their decision and revenue rights to an external operator. At one extreme the public authority may choose direct public provision (e.g. state owned enterprises) and itself as undertaking all operations and investments needed for the provision of the service. Alternatively, the local public authority may choose to involve an outside firm in the operation of the service choosing a contract in which it pays and external operator a fixed fee (e.g. management or service contract) or an intermediary management contract (e.g. concession) that is similar to a management or service contract except that a small part of the operators revenues depend on its performance. These contracts provide few incentives to reduce costs and transfer some risks and decision rights to private operators.
The risks should be allocated within a PPP in way that the party which can best bear the risk should also take up responsibility. This responsibility is mostly defined in the contractual agreements between the public and the private party. If the risks are wrongly allocated, the incentive structure of the PPP is insufficient for the parties involved and the output of the PPP in terms of quantity and quality of service can be negatively affected. Therefore the transfer of the risks to a party which is not the most appropriate to bear the risk can result in inefficiencies of the PPP. In the 2009 Guidelines, after discussing the importance of broadband for economic growth and recovery in Europe (Introduction) the European Commission (in the following Commission), specifies the rules applying for State aid regulations with respect to traditional broadband networks (Section 2) networks and with respect to Next Generation Access (NGA) networks (Section 3).
In Section 2, the CEU discusses the issue of State Aid and considers it as reasonable, in general, in rural and underserved areas, whereas it can distort competition in areas where broadband infrastructure already exists and competition takes place. In order to assess whether or not State Aid is appropriate a balancing test has to be undertaken involving the positive effects generated by an initiative related to the extent to which it incorporates "common interests" valued against its potential negative effects, related e.g. to "distortions of trade and competition" (section 2.3.1 of Guidelines). In the balancing test, the Commission defined specific criteria for the balancing test: if the objective of the common interests is well-defined, is a) State Aid still the most suitable instrument (or there are better instruments available; b) is there an incentive effect, i.e. "does State
Aid change the behavior of undertakings" and c) is the State Aid measure still proportional (or is less public support more appropriate) (para. 35).
In order to specify different types of public intervention, the CEU introduces the market economy investor principle (MEIP) as a way for a public party to invest in broadband without interfering with State Aid. In this case, the roll-out of broadband can be supported by a public intervention based on equity participation or by direct or indirect capital injections at market conditions into the undertaking company (para. 17). In addition, the Guidelines characterize as a fundamental case of absence of State Aid the principle of "Service of General Economic Interest"(SGEI). In this case, public compensation payments can be made as they do not constitute State aid. The principle of SGEI requires that a number of criteria are fulfilled: (1) the obligations for the party formally entrusted with public funding based on SGEI should be clearly defined, (2) to avoid an economic advantage to this party, the parameters for the compensation should be objective and transparent, (3) the compensation paid to this party should cover all actual costs for the SGEI plus a reasonable profit, and (4) this cost of this party should be compared to a typical and well-run company (para.
22).
The Commission defined different migration paths depending on the specific area addressed ("white", "black" and "grey" areas) depending on the prevalence of other broadband providers and the (non-)existence of competition in the area. For the evaluation of proposals in particular for grey areas, the Guidelines provide a number of criteria like detailed mapping and coverage analysis, tendering, most economically advantageous offer, technology neutrality, the use of existing infrastructure, conditions of wholesale access and benchmarking prices. As for the traditional broadband, public intervention in "white areas" is considered to be "in line" with State Aid regulations (section 2.3.2.1). In "black areas", there is no need for State intervention as there is "no market failure" (section 2.3.2.2), for "grey areas" a more detailed assessment is necessary (section 2.3.2.3). Furthermore, the Guidelines specify different options for public intervention in the case of NGA networks. In "white areas", public intervention is generally "supported" (section 3.4.1). In "grey areas", a "more detailed assessment" is required by looking e.g. at prices, services provided and demand for new services in the area (section 3.4.2). In "black areas" there again is "no need for
State intervention" (section 3.4.3) just in cases where there is insufficient investment of existing market parties thus giving municipalities the opportunity to offer financial support (Articles 77 and 78).
Separation have not been a part of the Guidelines, as there is just limited experience in Europe with respect to separation issues (e.g. in the United Kingdom and Italy ) and NGA developments.
NGA networks and the UFB initiative in New Zealand
In December 2008, the Commerce Commission of New Zealand initiated a discussion on the future of NGA networks with a discussion paper which included as important characteristics: a) that they should be aimed at long-term benefits of end users; b) preservation of incentives in particular in access networks; c) self-regulation of the industry should be preserved; d) regulation only be necessary to constrain market power and e) regulation should be scaled back if workable competition emerges. The document included a variety of technologies able to deliver NGA ranging from fiber technologies (e.g. Chorus as a facility based provider.
Commonalities and Differences
Similar to the European Commission, the government in New Zealand discovered in the 2008/9 the recognized the value of NGA networks for economic growth, in general, and for development of the broadband sector, in particular. Despite a broad discussion on the definition of NGA networks which took place in Europe and in New Zealand, different definitions are used in both countries to characterize NGA networks. In the European context, clear preference is given by defining NGA networks as wired networks (and exclude wireless and satellite but also copper networks).
Furthermore, the European Commission has defined different types of public intervention referring to public investment similar to market investor (MEIP principle) or based on public and social objective (SGEI principle). Furthermore, the Commission makes further distinctions between traditional broadband and next generation access networks which allow for a variety of migration paths in different coverage areas. "White areas" (with no pre-existing broadband or NGA networks)
are mostly eligible for State Aid, for "grey areas" (with broadband providers and even NGA networks) a detailed assessment is necessary. In "black areas' (with more than one NGA providers) no public intervention is necessary, but there are exceptions. In the case of New Zealand, the UFB initiative is changing the broadband landscape very fast as most "coverage areas" do not have any NGA infrastructure, with the exception of Wellington. There has been limited experience with separation in Europe and its effects of NGA rollout. In the New Zealand case, this experience is rather recent. However, it can be assumed that the relevant question with respect to NGA development in New Zealand is not so much related to the issues of separation, but challenges created by infrastructure competition in broadband markets and the consequence of policy decisions emerging from the UFB implementation.
Criteria European Guidelines (2009) UFB initiative Definition of NGA "wired access networks which consist wholly or in part of optical elements and which are capable of delivering broadband access services with enhanced characteristics (such as higher throughput) as compared to those provided over existing copper networks" "broad term to describe changes to telecommunication core and access networks to provide for modern day voice, data and media services." (1) NGA technologies "Mainly fibre-based or advanced upgraded cable networks that are intended to replace in whole or to a large extent the existing copperbased broadband networks or current cable networks. Grey areas "De facto monopoly" ("detailed assessment") NGA already deployed of planned ("detailed assessment")
Separation
Not specified Separation leading to Telecom NZ (retail (and mobile) operations and assigning wholesale activities) and Chorus (facility based provider) Sources: (Neumann, et al., 2011) and own investigation (1) website Commerce Commission New Zealand http://www.comcom.govt.nz/next-generationnetworks-2/ Interestingly, the growth of the broadband network in New Zealand has been fostered by just moderate private investment. In 2008/09, investment in the industry has been NZ$1.69 and has dropped back in subsequent years to $1.24 billion in 2010/11. However, decline in investment has largely been driven by Telecom New Zealand's extraordinary investment due to operational separation and its FFTN commitment to upgrade 3,600 roadside cabinets. Most investment in tangible infrastructure, in contrast, has remained relatively steady which has been different compared to other OECD countries were this type of investment has been weakened in the face of national crisis (Commerce Commission New Zealand, 2012a).
Extent of Intermodal Competition
Intermodal competition in broadband has been weak in New Zealand. As shown in Figure 2 , development of broadband in New Zealand has since 2002 been driven by the growth of DSL connections with market shares around 90 percent. Cable broadband connections had just a small percentage of the broadband market in 2002 and this percentage has remained rather until 2012. Similarly the contribution of alternative technologies ("other" in Figure 2 ) such as wireless broadband, satellite broadband or fiber connection to total broadband has been low. In June 2011, the market share of the different types of technology to total broadband was about 89 percent DSL and just around 8 percent cable connections (see Figure 2 ). Furthermore, there are a number of competing retailers like WorldxChange and TrustPower Kinect which are reselling services of Telecom New Zealand using different bundling strategies based on voice and broadband offerings. These strategies are aimed at increasing the number of consumers purchasing already fixed line services from them (Commerce Commission New Zealand, 2012a). In contrast to the average in European Union (EU27), the share of DSL connections on total broadband has been rather high. In countries like the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the market share of of DSL on total broadband has been lower (around 60 percent in the Netherlands and 80 percent in the United Kingdom) (see Figure 3 ). 
Regulatory Development effecting broadband development in New Zealand
In contrast to the ("third" way) European approach, the 'light-handed' regulatory approach prevailing in 
The role of PPI in the UFB initiative in New Zealand

Start of UFB initiative in December 2010
In the agreements with CFH and Chorus as well as with the LFCs and CFH, 33 priority areas were specified. With respect to these priority areas, Chorus was in charge of implementing the UFB initiative in close to 70 percent of the priority areas, followed by Enable (15.3 percent), WEL (13.7)
and Northpower (1.6). Northpower is covering the Whangarei area. Enable limited takes up responsibility in Christchurch and Rangiora. Ultra Fast Fibre led by WEL Networks in Hamilton, Tauranga, Tokoroa, New Plymouth, Hawera and Wanganui. Chorus will be in charge in most other parts of the country (for an overview of these areas see Table 10 ). Northpower began with the UFB rollout already in December 2010 in Whangarei. The company expected to have connected 7300 premises by June 2012 (Northpower, 2012) . In November 2011, Enable followed with rollout fiber in Christchurch with the objective to connect a population of more than 380,000 along with 7,000 businesses, some 1,000 medical centres and 170 schools. Over an eight year period the rollout should be completed. In February 2012, Chorus, Enable Networks, UltraFast Fiber and Northpower and other members of the Telecommunications Carrier Forum (TCF) wrote secretly to the Minister for Communications Amy Adams a letter called "CFH's Future Role" calling for CFH to be sidelined or scrapped. They argued that after CFH selected the coverage areas and set wholesale prices the "level of intervention and decision making powers by CFH inappropriately constrain the effective rollout of UFB". According to TCF, this inappropriate role of CFH was reflected, firstly, in its double status as partner in the rollout and at the same time as quasi-regulator; secondly, in its efforts to achieve national standardization and its involvement in the negotiating supply contracts and thirdly in its role to "drive uptake through awareness and other initiatives". Interestingly, the TCF already envisaged a situation in which "uptake is deemed to be too low in the near future". However, the forum's advice was that "involvement of CFH is not sought by retailers as they are confident that they can promote the broadband use without CFH assistance" (Telecommunications Carrier Forum, 2012) .
According to the Communications and Information Technology Minister Amy Adams, by August 2012 the UFB project had already exceeded its one year-one rollout target by more than 6,000 premises, leading to an expansion of the fibre network to more than 76,000 premises across New Zealand. During the period June 2011 and June 2012, 76,311 premises have officially been passed by the UFB network (originally planned: 70,000), with some 28,435 premises passed during the fourth quarter of this first year of the UFB initiative. Furthermore, the Rural Broadband Initiative delivered over the first period faster broadband to 69,000 rural homes and businesses, leading to some 585 schools which now have fibre connections past the school gate. In addition, four hospital connections have been completed (Amy Adams, 2012). However, actual uptake is trailing a long way behind. At the end of the first year of the UFB initiative only 1,233 users had been connected to the UFB with 155 of these users connected in the most recent quarter (Communications Day, 2012) . 
The role of PFI's in the UFB initiative
In contrast to their increasing growth on a global scale (Deloitte, 2006) , private-public partnerships (PPPs) have hardly operated at all in New Zealand until very recently (Jock, 2010; NIU, 2011) . This resistance against PPPs has been traced back (Owles, 2008) to a paper for the Treasury on Financing Infrastructure Projects which found "little empirical evidence about costs and benefits of PPPs" (Katz, 2006) . As a result, the New Zealand market for PPPs has been considered as "developing" (Deloitte, 2006; NIU, 2011) . In order to facilitate a more mature market for PPPs in New Zealand, the National Infrastructure Unit (NIU) of the Treasury has published a strategy paper "Managing the Implications of Public Private Partnerships" in which it has laid out the rationales and the importance of providing (public) support to PPPs and has described two experiments with innovative PPPs in the area of education and prison (NIU, 2011) . However, the vision document has been focused on the problems related to performance criteria and the management of the relationship between the different partners, to a lesser extent on the driving forces of public and private parties in entering into PPPs and the resulting choices for particular forms of PPPs.
With respect to the UFB initiative, the public private interplay between CFH and the four UFB companies (Chorus, UltraFast Fibre Ltd, Northpower and Enable) took very different and complex forms (Jock, 2010) . With UltraFast Fibre Ltd, Northpower and Enable, CFH signed contracts leading to different governance forms compared to Chorus (came into force as a result of a demerger from Telecom New Zealand). Based on different contractual relationships, CFH has invested NZ$929 million directly in Chorus with 50 percent being voting shares and 50 percent interest free loans (Flechter, 2011) . The other three other companies formed a joint venture with CFH (see Figure 9 ). The NZ Government supported the LFCs in deploying UFB initiative with NZ$ 1.5 billion. It is expected that with further private investments the overall UFB scheme investments will be a total of around NZ$ 3 billion. The different partners in the PFIs are CFH and different private firms (Northpower, UltraFastFibre Limited and Enable) as well as CFH and Chorus limited. These companies receive a concession for a period of 10 years. The three private firms invest in so-called three Local Fiber Companies ("LFCs"). CFH provides funding of the "communal" infrastructure i.e.
voting A shares are issued but no dividends are paid. The companies, in return, fund connection to end user costs leading to the issue of B non-voting 100% distribution shares. The different partner firms receive A shares when refunding CFH for "passing" costs on an end user basis. There is a Government Share, no voting rights or dividends, but the government has veto power. After the period of ten years, A and B shares converted into ordinary shares. However, the Government Share is not converted (Funston, 2010) .
Interestingly, the agreements between the CFH and LFCs as well as CFH and Chorus were rather differed with respect to their ownership structure and the incentives for the companies involved (see Table 2 ). In the following the focus is on the contractual agreements with Chorus and CFH as well as with the joint venture agreements with the other three companies and CFH accounting for the different kind of risks discussed above.
Statutory and political risks: Crown Fiber Holdings (CFH)
The statutory and political risks have been specified by the CFH in the Statement of Intent 2011 -2014 (Crown Fibre Holdings Limited, 2011a . CFH has tried to minimize the political risks by defining statutory rights in relying on a "statutory framework that applies to it, including (but not limited to)
the Public Finance Act 1989, the Crown Entities Act 2004 and the Companies Act (Act) 1993."
Furthermore, "Under the Act, the Board, each Director and each Shareholding Minister has the rights, powers, duties and obligations set out in the Act, except to the extent that they are negated or modified, in accordance with the Act, by CFH's constitution." In addition, "The (Ministry of Education) MED will be responsible (and CFH will not be responsible) for all regulatory and Government policy matters relating to the UFB Objective)" (Crown Fibre Holdings Limited, 2011a ).
CFH will manage and monitor the Crown's co-investment with UFB partners in order to achieve the Government's UFB Objective. It takes responsibility for selection process of UFB partners, appropriate measures of co-investment have still to be developed. CFH is expected to be "eventually" commercially viable and provide "a commercial return on the Crown's investment, and operate as a successful business, when directed by the Shareholding Ministers and the Minister for Communications and Information Technology "(Crown Fibre Holdings Limited, 2011a) .
In order to cover financial risks, CFH has been exempted by the Ministry of Finance from a number of sections of the Crowns Entities Act "due to the early stage of CFH's life cycle" related to statement of forecast service performance in the first financial year (Section 142 (1)(b)), classes of output the entity proposes to supply (Section 142 (2)) and statement of service performance in respect to the financial year to which it relates (Section 151 (b)).
Risks and contractual agreements: Local Fiber Company (LFC)
There are a number of contracts which are relevant for LFCs in the case of Northpower in particular the Network Infrastructure Project Agreement and Schedules which specifies, in detail, the design, Furthermore, the company would take responsibility (and risks) for the contracts drawn up with "subcontractors (including for civil works) as required to build the New Infrastructure for delivery".
In addition, the firm "will be responsible as primary obligor for all work carried out, and materials used or infrastructure provided, by any subcontractor" (Whangarei Local Fibre Company Limited, et al., 2010b) . In the part Delivery of the agreement, further obligations for Northpower have been With respect to demand and revenue risks, the agreements specifies that for Chorus should provide "industry's best practice fibre optic communications infrastructure network in the Coverage Area and generate widespread uptake of services (including Layer 1 Services and Layer 2 Services) in the Coverage Area." However, the uptake of services based on fiber will be the task of independent retail service providers, they will assume the demand risk. Limited, 2011). Furthermore, the document tried to exclude political risks (e.g. change in taxation or legislation) from the risk portfolio of the company (7.2 Modifications to Bill or Tax Rulings). In addition, the agreement specified that the regulatory risks will be the responsibility of the public party. In this context, the document characterized these risks in the following way: "Officials advised us that the reason for introducing a forbearance period is to achieve lower prices, by removing the risk premium; that is, investors would be more comfortable with lower returns initially because there is no risk that these returns would be undercut by regulation for the duration of the forbearance period". As a result a number of undertakings have been defined with respect to non- In contrast to the agreements with LFCs, the contracts between Chorus and CFH have been more detailed with respect to a number of anticipated risks (e.g. technical risks) and statutory (or political)
risks. As Chorus has a different company structure and strategy, in particular with respect to legacy assets, the definition of financial risks and residual value risk has been much more prominent compared to the contracts drawn up for the LFCs. However, LFCs and Chorus will be exposed to demand and revenue risks as these risks are allocated to retail service providers.
In addition, the current pricing structure as suggested by retail service providers does not allow for consumers to distinguish between the advantages of having fiber based services compared to using (only) bitstream access. It currently seems that fiber access is considered by consumers as just another higher segment in the existing broadband market based on speed (see Appendix 4).
Summary and Conclusions
The theoretical discussion of literature on public private interplay showed that PPIs can have rather different and a complex forms ranging from pure market transactions to strictly vertically integrated forms. As an alternative way of fostering private investment in the broadband development, the risks posed by these ventures are in different ways allocate to the private and public stakeholders involved. The key for the success of these ventures lies in the ability to allocate these risks to the party which best can bare these risks.
In Broadband Guidelines but also in new existing case law. In New Zealand, new insights can be gained from the effects of separation on NGA rollout.
With respect to the structure and evolution of the broadband sector, New Zealand has -after a period of slow growth of broadband -taken the opportunity to foster NGA growth based on the UFB initiative. As the initiative has been considered as successful in terms of providing fiber to the curb after the first year of UFB implementation, actual take up of fiber based connections of subscribers is still trailing.
In examining the structure of the agreements between Chorus and CFH as well as between the LFCs and CFH, the allocation of the different risks between private firms and CFH has been analyzed. If the risks are wrongly allocated, the incentive structure of the ventures is insufficient for the parties involved and the output of the ventures in terms of quantity and quality of service can be negatively affected. In the paper, it has been found that for the three joint ventures a number of risks are specified in particular with respect to statutory and political risks (responsibility of CFH and different ministries); and design, construction, time schedule, and operation risk (taken by the LFC). For a number of other risks (like financial risks or, technical risks), they are not sufficiently specified yet.
The contracts between Chorus and CFH have been different with respect to a number of anticipated risks (e.g. technical risks), statutory (or political) risks, financial risks and residual value risks. We furthermore found that LFCs and Chorus will be exposed to demand and revenue risks because these risks are allocated to retail service providers. In addition, it seems that that due to the sharing of risk between different parties, the joint venture form of governance is more appropriate compared to the contractual arrangements between Chorus and CFH. 
